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DO HELL AND EXCLUSIVISM MAKE  
PROCREATION MORALLY IMPERMISSIBLE? 
A REPLY TO KENNETH HIMMA
Shawn Bawulski
In a recent work, Kenneth Himma argues that the doctrines of exclusivism 
and hell in Christian theology lead to a reductio when combined with certain 
ethical principles about reproduction; he concludes that if both doctrines are 
true, then it is morally impermissible to procreate. Since the Christian tradi-
tion holds that procreation is at least morally permissible, if the argument is 
valid, then one or more of its premises should be abandoned. In response to 
this argument, I will present several theological and philosophical objections, 
showing that no inconsistency has been demonstrated in holding Christian 
exclusivism, a traditional doctrine of hell, and the moral permissibility of  
procreation. 
Suppose you knew the following: the odds are good that, if you procreate, 
your child’s life will be characterized by intense suffering.1 In such circum-
stances, would it be wrong for you to procreate? Do you have an obligation 
(to prevent suffering) that prohibits having children? If you think so, then 
you share the intuition that drives Kenneth Himma’s recent essay “Birth 
as a Grave Misfortune.”2 There, he contends that this intuition creates a 
serious problem for traditional Christianity’s doctrine of hell. My aim in 
this paper is to show that Himma’s argument suffers at least three major 
flaws. First, it ignores the theological context within which the doctrine is 
situated; hence, it makes a number of assumptions that many traditional 
Christians do not endorse. In other words, if Himma has shown any-
thing, it’s that there is a problem for the doctrine of hell in some theological 
frameworks. But since Himma has not demonstrated that Christians are 
obligated to accept any framework containing the features in question, it’s 
hard to see how the problem could be as general as he suggests. Second, 
1I am thankful to many who commented on earlier drafts of this article, including 
Stephen R. Holmes, those at the St Mary’s Theology Research Seminar (especially Ryan 
Mullins), Thomas P. Flint, and three anonymous reviewers. Bob Fischer deserves special 
thanks for providing detailed interaction: his comments and insights were extremely helpful. 
Of course, any mistakes or flaws are entirely my own. 
2Kenneth Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” in The Problem of Hell: A Philosophical 
Anthology, ed. Joel Buenting (Farnham, Surrey, GB: Ashgate, 2010), 179–198.
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putting aside the theological issues, the argument is simply too strong, 
since by the principles utilized procreation is always morally prohibited, 
regardless of the truth of the traditional doctrine of hell or exclusivism. 
This is because (a) there are several other substantial harms apart from 
hell that might befall a child in the future and (b) these other potential 
harms would do nearly the same work as the doctrine of hell in Himma’s 
argument; thus (c) on his account procreation would be a bad idea tout 
court. Third, the argument crucially depends on a consequentialist moral 
theory which, if rejected, renders it irrelevant to the moral permissibility 
of procreating. 
I will begin with some terminology. For my purposes, the traditional 
doctrine of hell (TDH) is the view that (a) hell is populated, (b) hell is in-
escapable for those consigned there, and (c) those consigned to hell con-
sciously experience everlasting and severe suffering.3 Exclusivism is the 
view that conscious assent to the Christian gospel (in this life) is necessary 
for salvation—e.g., for being spared consignment to hell.4 Also, let’s articu-
late (in Himma’s own words) the intuition with which this essay began as 
The New Life Principle (NLP): 
It is morally impermissible to bring a new child into the world when there 
is a sufficiently high probability [that] doing so will create a substantial risk 
that the child will invariably suffer severe harm as a direct consequence of 
being born.5
Himma’s Argument
Himma’s argument, then, is as follows:
(H1) Suppose that TDH and exclusivism are true.
(H2) By TDH, hell is a severe harm.
(H3) By exclusivism and the observable and presumably sustained 
paucity of those who embrace the Christian gospel within the 
world population, there is a sufficiently high probability that any 
given child will be consigned to hell as a direct consequence of 
being born.
(H4) So if NLP is true, then it is morally impermissible to bring a new 
child into the world.
3Himma’s definitions are similar, see ibid., 194. I note that many who hold both Christian 
exclusivism and some version of the traditional doctrine of hell would likely resist his char-
acterization of their views, but this need not detain us now.
4Certainly this definition is incomplete, not least because qualifications would need to 
be added about the severely mentally disabled, babies and children who die before real-
izing the possibility of exercising saving faith, and the redeemed who lived before the Cross. 
However, this definition of exclusivism will suffice for present purposes as long as it is re-
membered that it applies to those living in the present age who have capacities and faculties 
such that things like assent and faith might be applicable. 
5Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 192.
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(H5) NLP is true.
(H6) Therefore it is morally impermissible to bring a new child into the 
world.
(H1) means that those who lack genuinely saving Christian faith will 
experience eternal torment in hell.6 Himma deems existence in hell a severe 
harm (“the most severe any human being can face”)—hence (H2).7 
(H3) attempts to establish that the probability conditions of NLP are 
met. Himma says that the probability of not going to hell—that someone 
will have genuinely saving Christian faith—is, globally, at best 1 in 3 and 
is likely even lower (since only about 2 billion of the 6+ billion people alive 
today even profess to be Christian, and it is unlikely that all or even most 
of those 2 billion have genuinely saving Christian faith, however we might 
define that).8 He argues that although it is hard to define the threshold of 
risk creation where NLP applies, most of us would consider 2 in 3 odds 
to be sufficiently high. Considered globally, Himma concludes that the 
probability conditions of NLP are met.
Himma does recognize that the probability of having saving Christian 
faith is not evenly distributed across the globe—certain regions have a 
much lower probability than 1 in 3, others have a much higher. Since both 
parents and society play major roles in what a child will believe, he sug-
gests that we should think regionally when calculating probabilities for 
NLP. 9 However, even when considered in areas of highest probability for 
a child to have saving Christian faith, the probability conditions of NLP 
are met.
This is because of epistemic problems that arise in applying NLP, even for 
Christians. Himma says that, on exclusivism, belief in the truth of the core 
doctrines of the Christian faith is necessary but not sufficient for authentic 
Christian faith (and thus salvation).10 The first problem: of the roughly 2 
billion professing Christians, it is not at all clear how many actually have 
genuinely saving faith. He regards as optimistic the supposition that even 
half of professing Christians are genuinely saved, meaning that even in the 
best of regions in the world the odds of a Christian couple having a child 
eventually condemned to hell is 1 in 2. He then invokes David Benatar’s 
principle as applied to a yet non-existent child: the avoidance of suffering 
in hell—even when avoided because the person remains non-existent—is 
a moral good, whereas the lack of pleasure because of non-existence is not 
6Ibid., 194. 
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 195–196. He also notes the implication that parents in regions where Christian 
belief is unlikely have a moral duty not to procreate, even if they do not realize it—an im-
plication he finds uncomfortable. Yet from the standpoint of Christian theism, perhaps any 
potential moral duty not to procreate would be eclipsed by a bigger issue: the obligation all 
people have to repent and turn to Jesus Christ, the Savior, in faith.
10Ibid., 196.
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a moral bad.11 Whatever the threshold may be, certainly 1 in 2 odds is not 
good enough to avoid the force of NLP. The second problem: he says that 
we cannot have epistemic justification about any theory of what constitutes 
genuinely saving Christian faith. The lack of agreement on the issue shows 
“that we do not have enough information on the question that would 
clearly show which view is correct, and hence that no one is epistemically 
justified in whatever view they take on the issue.”12 
His argument then addresses what one must do in such a situation. He 
says, 
The problem here is that we lack sufficient information to determine what 
counts as authentic saving faith and so we cannot even begin to estimate the 
most relevant probability in applying NLP. Moral concern dictates that, under 
conditions where we lack such important information, we guard against the 
most catastrophic of outcomes—which, of course, would be eternal torment 
in hell. Even where nominal Christians are concerned, it appears that it is 
morally wrong to have children not because the conditions of NLP are clear-
ly satisfied, but because we are not in any epistemic position to determine 
whether they are—and are morally required to adopt a more conservative 
strategy in protecting the interests of potential future beings.13 
In other words: since, for all we know, NLP might apply, we thus must act 
as if it does—it is morally impermissible to procreate. Hence (H4).
11Benatar’s principle seems to have significant influence on Himma’s thinking and argu-
ments and thus a bit of explanation is in order. Himma restates Benatar’s principle as “the 
absence of a benefit is not a moral evil, but the absence of harm is always a moral good.” 
Ibid., 183. This is relevant to the current discussion in that we are considering harms and 
benefits regarding “non-existent but possible individuals,” which is a markedly different 
matter than with the already existent. Ibid., 184. Himma says, “For an existent individual 
x, pleasure is always a moral good, while suffering is always a moral bad. If x does not 
exist, then the absence of suffering x would have experienced is always a moral good, 
but the absence of pleasure x would have experienced is not a moral bad.” Ibid., 184. Fol-
lowing Benatar, he notes that this principle has intuitive support: (1) people rarely have 
children for the intended purpose of benefiting the yet-conceived child; (2) failing to bring 
a person into existence cannot be regretted for the sake of that person but only because of 
some unsatisfied interest in the parent; and (3) many people regard the absence of pain to 
have more moral weight than the presence of pleasure. Ibid., 184–185. See David Benatar, 
“Why It Is Better Never to Come into Existence,” in Life, Death & Meaning: Key Philosophical 
Readings on the Big Questions, ed. David Benatar (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2004), 157–164. Ultimately Benatar argues that it is always better not to have been brought 
into existence, a conclusion that Himma does not share, but since we know that any child 
will experience at least one harm in her life, it is unclear how Himma resists this implica-
tion of Benatar’s principle. See also David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of 
Coming into Existence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 28ff. Throughout this book, 
he considers only the possibility of valuating goods from a purely “human subjective” 
standpoint. He decidedly avoids the possibility of objective goods as understood in a 
theistic framework (except in a very unsatisfying and unfair three-page treatment in his 
conclusion, 221–223). Essentially, he assumes atheistic naturalism and argues that human 
existence always involves an unacceptable harm (see 81–86). He provides no reason to 
accept such an important assumption, one that would fundamentally alter the entirety of 
his argument.
12Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 197.
13Ibid., 197–198.
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In defending (H5), Himma advances some cases in which he believes it 
is clearly morally impermissible to decide to bring a child into the world.14 
He first gives the example where reproducing carries a high probability 
of resulting in a child whose life is short and terribly painful, but post-
poning conception for a few years would pose no elevated risk of such 
a condition. If the couple is aware of all this, the intuition is that they are 
morally obligated to delay and intentionally proceeding with conception 
in this high-risk period is morally wrong even if the child is not born with the 
condition.15 He then extends this intuition to cases where the high-risk is 
permanent. Any right to have children would be outweighed when there 
is a high probability of this sort of terrible condition befalling the child. 
Again, even if the child beats the odds and is not born with the predicted 
condition, the parents have still committed a wrong against the child. 
“Reckless or negligent risk-creation is itself considered a wrong,” as illus-
trated by our criminalization and moral condemnation of driving while 
intoxicated.16 Himma also suggests that such a principle would apply to 
a young, unwed, irresponsible mother who lacks the means and ability to 
provide for her child, and to parents in countries where the child is likely 
to face serious malnutrition.17 
From these sorts of instances Himma derives NLP. He notes three points 
of vagueness in the principle: 1) “sufficiently”—it is hard to draw the line 
as to when risk-creation has become sufficiently high; 2) “substantial”—
it is probably impossible to quantify a probability threshold for a risk 
being substantial; 3) “severe”—it is unclear what counts as severe harm.18 
However, Himma does not regard this vagueness as a fatal problem for 
the principle—at least as it applies to procreation and hell. Himma says 
that NLP captures “widely shared views” regarding cases like those he 
provides as examples: cases about medical conditions, the risk-creation 
in driving while intoxicated, young unmarried mothers, and situations 
with a high likelihood of malnutrition.19 Himma seems to regard NLP as 
representative of many if not most people’s moral intuitions.
(H6) is a claim that many—perhaps even most—Christians would re-
ject. From Ps. 127:3, “children are a gift of the Lord”; certainly a gift from 
the Lord is a moral good.20 Since Himma seems to think that everyone 
14Himma toys with the notion that the potentiality of commonplace difficulties and suf-
fering in this life may or may not be enough to render having children morally impermissible 
for everyone; he is ultimately unsure about this.
15Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 188.
16Ibid., 190.
17Ibid., 192.
18Ibid., 193.
19Ibid., 192.
20Himma asks whether having children is a moral good, noting that typically many 
benefits come to both the parents and the child and usually these benefits would (at least 
seemingly) outweigh any accompanying suffering that might befall the parents or the child. 
He also recognizes that this perspective has Scriptural support—having children is plausibly 
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should be committed to (H2)–(H5), the falsehood of (H6) entails the false-
hood of (H1): either exclusivism or TDH (or both) are false.
By Way of Response
Before offering some critiques and criticisms of Himma’s argument, I 
should first state that we are in substantial agreement that children are a 
moral good, indeed, a blessing from the Lord. I affirm the biblical picture 
of procreation as a good. I also appreciate his concern to take seriously the 
moral implications of procreation vis-à-vis the problem of hell. However, 
doing philosophical theology carries the liability of analyzing a doctrine 
in isolation of the relevant aspects of the broader theological picture, and 
Himma appears in danger of falling into this trap. We cannot rightly think 
about eschatology in absence of consideration of the doctrine of God. 
Christian doctrines are all interconnected; there is a “holism” to Christian 
theology. 
As I have indicated, I think that there are several deep flaws with his 
argument; I suspect that no argument along these lines will be successful. 
However, whether or not that suspicion is correct, if it turns out that even 
one of the objections below is on target, that is enough to refute Him-
ma’s accusation of logical inconsistency among Christian exclusivism, 
TDH, and the moral permissibility of procreation. While admittedly the 
issues raised in these objections have varying degrees of agreement by 
Christians, by offering them I provide theological concepts and views that 
are justifiably affirmed by many Christians. By providing some possible 
ways in which a Christian can consistently hold exclusivism, TDH, and 
the moral permissibility of procreation, I show that Himma’s argument—
which contends that these are logically incompatible and thus there is no 
way to hold them consistently—can be justifiably rejected. I will organize 
my objections under two headings: theological and philosophical.
Theological Objections
The first theological objection relies on a certain theology of procreation, 
which I will discuss briefly before directly raising the objection. Throughout 
his essay Himma uses phrases like “bring a child into the world,” “bringing 
a child into existence,” “bring a new human life into existence,” and “pro-
create” seemingly interchangeably. I will not quibble with these phrases 
themselves, which are largely commonplace, but rather I will raise an 
a moral good. He next considers if having children is a moral duty. Recognizing the “be 
fruitful and multiply” imperatives in Genesis (1:28 and 9:7, given both before and after the 
fall) and mentioning 1 Tim. 5:14, he observes that from these and other factors many Chris-
tians regard procreation to be a moral duty in marriage (whenever possible). For many, this 
duty may not entail a large family, but some procreation is obligatory. Exceptions to this rule 
might be granted when the parents have reasonable expectation the child will be unhealthy 
in some significant way, but otherwise the duty applies. After some discussion on the matter, 
Himma states that whether merely a moral good or also a moral duty, the conclusion from 
Christian ethics is that having children is a blessing and is at least morally permissible (if not 
obligatory). 
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objection to their underlying concept as he uses them. Crucially lacking 
is any consideration for God’s activity; it seems that Himma’s concept of 
procreation is theologically impoverished. From Ps. 127:3—children are a 
gift from the Lord, and he is the giver of life.21 Himma states this initially in 
his essay, but it is strangely absent when he moves to discuss the morality 
of the decision to procreate, leaving his essay liable to the impression that 
only human agency is relevant. The view taken up in this objection says 
that God’s activity in procreation is paramount and is significant for the 
procreation decision. I do not autonomously create a new person; rather, 
God creates a new person in a way that involves my actions (reproduction). 
Humans of course have more than a trivial role, but it is a serious mis-
take to treat biological reproduction as a complete account of procreation. 
Equally problematic is discussing moral issues surrounding the decision to 
procreate in isolation of this theological truth. 
Given a view of procreation of this sort, I can now state the first theo-
logical objection: NLP entails (or at least strongly suggests) hard dogmatic 
universalism (HDU), which defenders of TDH find very problematic; be-
cause of this entailment, they are justified in rejecting NLP. This objection 
warrants explanation. 
Initially, assume that God is active in procreation in a way similar to 
that which was just described: God in a very meaningful sense “brings a 
new child into the world.” It seems plausible on the face of it, then, that 
NLP should also apply to God. Nowhere does Himma state this, although 
nowhere does he deny it. However, the broad scope and force of Himma’s 
NLP, taken together with no indication as to why God should be excepted 
from it, justifies this consideration of the possibility. Let us start with the 
assumption, then, that God is somehow bound by NLP, and see what 
comes of it. 
Attempting to apply NLP to God demonstrates some substantial prob-
lems which suggest that, in fact, NLP does not apply to God. Remember 
that NLP says it is morally impermissible to bring a new child into the 
world when certain conditions are met; one of those conditions is that a 
sufficiently high probability is realized. In applying NLP to God’s actions, 
the epistemic considerations regarding probability are presumably much 
different than ours. Let us assume that the doctrine of divine foreknowl-
edge is true, as the preponderance of Christian theists have believed (and 
as most defenders of TDH would believe, I suspect). For any given person 
x, God always knows the truth value of “x will refuse to repent and will 
eventually be among the reprobate” for every possible world, including 
the actual one. Every person’s eternal fate is known by God with com-
plete certainty (either by divine determination, by his certain knowledge 
of their future libertarianly free decisions, or by something like these). 
Given this, the concepts of “probability” and “risk” fade from NLP when 
21Ps. 139:13 is another relevant verse.
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applied to God. In the case of God, NLP would then need to be modified 
so as to read something like: 
NLP(God): It is morally impermissible to bring a new child into the world 
when doing so will make it the case that the child will invariably suffer  
severe harm as a direct consequence of being born.
If God is obligated by NLP(God) as this view of procreation would 
suggest, then it is morally impermissible for God to bring a person into 
the world who will suffer hell. The moral principles that give NLP trac-
tion regarding us would presumably apply to God as well, stripped of 
our epistemic limitations. When NLP is applied to us, there are epistemic 
concerns that involve a threshold of probability and risk. It seems that for 
God, the epistemic probability of a proposition is just that proposition’s 
objective probability; hence, the epistemic probability of a person’s suf-
fering hell is either 0 or 1. Assuming that God could do something such as 
prevent the conception of every person who would unrepentantly reject 
him and be condemned, he would be morally permitted to bring a new 
child into the world only if that child will experience salvation. 
Given the very reasonable assumptions made throughout this objection, 
unless some very good reason to except God from NLP (or NLP(God)) is 
provided, NLP (or NLP(God)) seems to entail that hard dogmatic univer-
salism (HDU) is true. By HDU I mean that universalism is necessarily true 
(“hard”) and that we have sufficient reason to hold it dogmatically.22 HDU 
will obviously be rejected by defenders of TDH, most of whom contend 
that God has a morally sufficient reason for a populated hell (to pursue 
this any further we would enter the realm of the defenses against problem 
of evil, far beyond my current scope). If NLP entails HDU, then very com-
pelling arguments for HDU will need to be provided. Absent such argu-
ments, the defender of TDH is justified in resisting NLP. 
The second theological objection, perhaps the stronger, contends that 
Himma’s application of NLP to hell is misguided. It rejects a notion in-
herent in Himma’s argument—that eternal punishment is for innocent 
victims who had the misfortune of having existence thrust upon them by 
their parents. With NLP, the suffering in view comes “as a direct conse-
quence of being born.” No respectable account of TDH posits reprobation 
as a direct result of being born. Being born does not decide the probability 
or actuality of one’s eternal destiny: some other factor does.
For defenders of TDH it is sin, not being born, that explains the suffering 
in hell. Also, for most defenders of TDH, the suffering in hell is linked to 
the agent’s liability for punishment (although the details of this linkage 
and liability vary).23 There are several different accounts in Christian 
22For more on necessary universalism and some of its problems, see Jonathan L. Kvanvig, 
The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 77–96.
23There is a theological tradition that says an individual’s liability for punishment includes 
both actual sins committed and guilt that comes from some solidarity between Adam’s first 
act of sin and his progeny, as discussed in Romans 5:12–21. In fact, for this view, the former 
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theology as to why some people end up in hell, but the defender of TDH 
will insist the decisive factor(s) has more to do with sin than with condi-
tions entirely outside of her (such as her existing). Usually hell is depicted 
as the result of the individual moral agent’s sin and lack of repentance, 
never something that “happens to them” in a way an illness does.24 Himma 
assumes that the suffering in eternal punishment is rightly analogous to 
the suffering and harm from things like a genetic disease, an environment 
horribly hostile to human flourishing with no likelihood of that changing 
(say, nuclear holocaust), or even the suffering that most people encounter 
in this life. However, the difference is very important—these types of suf-
ferings are not directly linked to the sufferer’s moral accountability.25
In other words, the defender of TDH insists that whether or not the suf-
fering is justly deserved is a major factor. Suppose a parent somehow had 
good reason to suspect a .25 probability that her child would suffer just 
punishment in life (say, imprisonment and paying restitution for arson); 
that is very different than a comparably certain suspicion of a .25 prob-
ability that her child will suffer from painful arthritis in life. Questions 
about seemingly undeserved suffering are to be answered in a response to 
the problem of evil, not here. Himma’s argument founders in that it fails 
to recognize this important feature of TDH as most defend it: it is just. 
Himma has not provided the defender of TDH enough reason to think 
that the two supposedly analogous situations (risk of a genetic disease 
and procreating in a fallen world) are sufficiently similar for the intuitions 
to transfer.26
comes because of the latter. Even a theological tradition that sees original guilt in this way 
still holds that the individual is guilty and thus liable for punishment. As long as a compat-
ible account of justice is provided (many are available), there is no internal contradiction, 
and the difference between just suffering and suffering from the likes of a genetic disorder 
can be maintained. 
24At this point a brief word on the problem of the unevangelized seems in order. Working 
in the background of Himma’s argument is this assumption: given exclusivism, a person 
cannot be justly condemned to hell unless she has opportunity to hear and properly re-
spond to the Christian gospel (a response which on the exclusivist’s account is required for 
salvation). In situations in which there is never any opportunity to hear the Christian gospel 
(i.e., the unevangelized), reprobation is still the inevitable result of being born, albeit not the 
direct consequence (as was stated in NLP). Himma says similarly with situations where high 
probability but not quite inevitability obtains, situations which are largely his focus. In this 
way the unevangelized are the limit case of a principle behind Himma’s objection to TDH 
and exclusivism. However, he provides no reason to accept this assumption, one that much 
of the Christian tradition does not hold, and several plausible alternative accounts from de-
fenders of TDH and exclusivism are available. For an example of just one—although not my 
own—see William Lane Craig, “‘No Other Name’: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the 
Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ,” Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989), 172–188. 
25Interestingly, see John 9:1–12.
26A brief word here on the matters of original sin and original guilt. Between a genetic 
disease and punishment in hell, Himma’s argument seems to assume a major point of simi-
larity that legitimizes the analogy: the inevitability or near inevitability of risk of harm (even 
harm that justly comes from punishment). While he does not specify it, in attacking the 
traditional view I take it Himma assumes that the doctrines of original sin and/or original 
guilt establish this inevitability of a liability to punishment (given TDH and exclusivism). 
Even with qualifications to the traditional view that provide exception for a person who 
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Philosophical Objections
The first philosophical objection is that Himma’s probability assignments 
are dubitable: even if we grant (H5) (the truth of NLP) and some of his 
other questionable assumptions, still his method of risk calculation seems 
deeply flawed—particularly on the matter of localization. He discusses 
global probabilities and then narrows down to regional probabilities, but 
he never considers things at the most relevant level for the procreation 
decision: the details of the immediate situation for the specific parents 
and child. In Himma’s scheme, regarding the birth of a child, globally the 
probability of the “substantial harm” of hell is at best 2 in 3, probably 
higher; in geographic regions where Christianity is strong, it is perhaps 
1 in 2. Yet certainly one can and should consider more factors, especially 
localized factors. The background information relevant to the probability 
of genuine Christian faith is vastly more extensive than the global or even 
regional believer/non-believer ratio: in fact, that ratio is virtually irrel-
evant. An example will be illustrative.
What is the probability of reprobation for the potential child of would-
be parents who are deeply committed Christians, actively involved in 
a thriving local church, who have a stable and functional marriage and 
home life as well as a healthy spiritual life, and who fully intend to raise 
their child in the way that best encourages and facilitates both assent to 
the truth of the core doctrines of Christianity and the lifelong exercising of 
genuinely saving faith? While it might vary somewhat among different 
times and cultures, I should think that in this type of situation the prob-
ability would be quite low, even if we have uncertainty as to what exactly 
constitutes genuinely saving Christian faith. While we might lack absolute 
epistemic certainty about anyone’s salvation, legions of Christians could 
be produced who, by even a more strict account of salvation requirements, 
would almost universally be recognized as among those who ought to be 
regarded as having genuinely saving Christian faith. For any potential 
parents who have the properties listed above—properties that strongly 
tend to result in children who by most everyone’s account very likely 
have real saving Christian faith—what probability of reprobation would 
be low enough so that NLP does not apply? .2? .1? .05? While Himma 
has (rightly) stated that it can be difficult to specify thresholds, he also 
recognizes that that vagueness need not be fatal when the situation would 
be in a particular category on any reasonable placement of the threshold. 
It seems to me that just this has happened with the above example: the 
never reached the developmental stage where personal moral accountability/sin become 
possible (in other words, having committed actual sin is in fact a feature all the reprobate 
will possess), Himma’s likely complaint would be that apart from these exceptions, there is 
an inevitability of committing actual sin (assuming Pelagianism is false). However, Christian 
theology posits at least one human being who, in fact, never committed actual sin, despite 
being fully human: Jesus Christ. Again I insist that on this point the analogy breaks down—
even if in fact nearly no one avoids sin, still, no one sins innocently or without culpability. 
The analogy is invalid regardless of questions of original sin and guilt because the suffering 
is so fundamentally different.
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couple who fits that description would not be prevented from procreating 
by NLP and they would be in an adequate epistemic position to make that 
determination. The epistemic probability of this couple’s child avoiding 
eternal punishment is quite high, certainly high enough to make procre-
ation morally permissible.
This example demonstrates that even if we grant that probability is 
the right approach to this issue, many of the statistically relevant factors 
are usually within the parents’ control—how they raise their kids and 
what they teach and demonstrate to them about Christian faith. Even on 
Himma’s account, many Christian couples could procreate without vio-
lating moral principles while still consistently holding TDH and Christian 
exclusivism.
Himma would likely reply that the horrors of hell swamp even very 
low probabilities like those in this example. In a utilitarian calculus such 
as Himma’s, as potential costs go up, the probabilities become excessive, 
leading to lower and lower thresholds. Yet there is an overlooked factor: 
the potential good of gaining great eternal benefit for a person may well 
offset the potential costs. A cost-benefit approach cannot emphasize 
radical costs while also ignoring radical benefits, and in the example of 
these Christian parents, radical benefits seem highly probable. Even if we 
share his moral intuitions about risk, it is not clear that avoiding the risk of 
hell is preferable to the possibility of salvation and eternal bliss. Benatar’s 
principle is not nearly as obvious as Himma presents it to be, and this is 
especially so when the potential goods in question involve the everlasting 
happiness of eternal life in fellowship with the Lord. 
The second philosophical objection is that NLP runs the risk of cut-
ting too deeply. Given NLP and the way Himma handles epistemic is-
sues surrounding it, it seems his argument has the liability of prohibiting 
procreation even without assuming TDH and exclusivism. Himma briefly 
wrestles with the possibility that the world is not the sort of place one ought 
to bring a child into (although it is tangential to his main point), seemingly 
uncertain about his own conclusion.27 Regardless, if our epistemic access 
to the eternal fate of a potential child is limited such that we are morally 
required to take up the more conservative strategy of refraining because 
we cannot determine if NLP applies or not, then how are we not likewise 
required to take the same strategy with most any potentially severe suf-
fering our children might face? 
Consider cases of potential parents in areas of the world where war, 
starvation, disease, etc. are prevalent, or any situation where there is a high 
epistemic probability of a child suffering in this life. NLP would seemingly 
rule out procreation in these cases (again, apart from TDH, exclusivism, or 
any consideration beyond just this life). On Himma’s account, procreation 
would be morally impermissible for poor married couples, for anyone 
living in impoverished communities, and even for some entire nations 
27Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 187–188.
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(indeed, as noted above, Himma says as much). I suspect many would 
share my discomfort with this implication.
Yet these problems with NLP are not limited merely to cases such as 
these. NLP would seem to put unreasonable burdens on anyone consid-
ering procreation. Let’s consider genetic disorders: would NLP apply to 
the couple who had a statistical risk for a serious genetic disorder but 
did not know this fact and had no reason to suspect it? As NLP is stated, 
it seems it would. Must every couple undergo every genetic test or pre-
screening available before they have actionable certainty that NLP does 
not apply to their situation? Even if they did, it is not clear that they would 
have enough certainty—what about the genetic disorders for which there 
is currently no test, or the ones we have yet to discover? If this paralyzing 
burden is imposed by NLP regarding genetic disorders, how much more 
fatal is it to procreation when we add considerations about other forms 
of potential suffering in this life? Cancer, depression, severe arthritis, 
drug addiction, frequent migraines, and a long list of other conditions 
that make a person’s life deeply marked by suffering are not rare, and we 
have no substantial epistemic certainty that our children will be likely to 
avoid these. Moving beyond the level of the individual, we seem to have a 
lack of certainty in assessing the probability of an outbreak of worldwide 
hunger, nuclear attack, an epidemic of disease, or any number of similar 
things. The possibility of any of these would seemingly prohibit procre-
ation for everyone.
It seems (granting the contentious: that goods and harms sum) that un-
less one takes up HDU (in which we are quite certain that any potential 
suffering in life is outweighed by the certainty of salvation and eternal 
happiness—and we have very little doubt about the truth of this doctrine), 
we are probably never in an adequate epistemic position to know if NLP 
applies or not. Himma’s account seems to limit the morally acceptable 
options to two: procreate only if both would-be parents are strongly con-
vinced of the truth of HDU, or refrain from procreation altogether. TDH or 
not, exclusivism or no exclusivism, without HDU (which Himma himself 
does not hold) it is hard to see how NLP does not prohibit any and all 
procreation in a world with suffering and evil in it.28 
28Himma’s own position is one of salvific pluralism, where “all the major religious tradi-
tions are [viable] paths to salvation.” See Kenneth Einar Himma, “Finding a High Road: The 
Moral Case for Salvific Pluralism,” international Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (2002): 1. 
However, I suggest that even pluralism is not enough to avoid the force of NLP: what if in 
this life my child refuses to sincerely take up any faith? What if she embraces and pursues 
immorality and evil? Both of these are real possibilities, and then, on non-universalist plu-
ralism, she will still incur the harm of hell. Since I am not in an adequate epistemic position 
to know with sufficient certainty that my child will refrain from reveling in wickedness and 
immorality, “the most catastrophic of outcomes” must be guarded against and the more 
conservative strategy is required, according to Himma. Even on pluralism, NLP prohibits 
procreation. Thus, the severe restrictions imposed by NLP can be avoided only with HDU 
(or something very, very near it), or by rejecting NLP.
It seems that NLP can be redeemed only by HDU. HDU’s power to save NLP lies in 
the role it plays in a universalist response to the problem of evil (i.e., the evil and suffering 
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The third philosophical objection is to reject the consequentialist moral 
theory upon which Himma’s argument so crucially depends. He weighs 
the costs and benefits of deciding to procreate and concludes that, under 
exclusivism and TDH, the probabilities are such that the possible costs 
clearly outweigh the possible benefits. In fact, the costs more or less out-
weigh any conceivable benefits, since these will either be too insignificant 
to offset hell or too uncertain to justify the “gamble” on them. No argu-
ments for his moral theory are provided, and consequentialism is hardly 
the dominant view amongst Christian theists (and I suspect even less so 
among Christian theists who defend TDH). If some other moral theory 
were held, Himma’s argument—even if it were transparently valid—would 
be simply beside the point regarding the moral permissibility of procre-
ating, and the defender of TDH and exclusivism would be justified in 
rejecting it. 
Conclusion: Better Not to Have Been Born?
I have provided a few arguments to show that Himma’s arguments fall 
short.29 He ignores the theological context in which the doctrine of hell is 
a potential child will likely experience is counterbalanced or overbalanced by the specific 
good of everyone experiencing salvation). However, if a response to the problem of evil that 
involves HDU is acceptable and does not prohibit procreation, why should we think that a 
response to the problem of evil that does not involve HDU cannot also succeed? Thomas 
Talbott argues that HDU is required for the problem of evil, but many find his case far from 
compelling. See, for example, Talbott’s chapters in Universal salvation?: The Current Debate, 
ed. Robin A. Parry and Christopher H. Partridge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003) and 
the criticisms in the subsequent chapters. If a plausible response to the problem of evil can be 
compatible with TDH, as defenders of TDH will hold, then the possibility of eternal punish-
ment does not make the decision to procreate a non-starter.
29The language of it being better not to have been born is one that Himma uses and one 
that appears in Scripture, so it warrants some treatment here. Himma admits that sometimes 
when reflecting on the difficulties of life, he is tempted with the thought that “I might have 
been better off never having been born” (Himma, “Birth as a Grave Misfortune,” 187). I have 
great sympathy for Himma and for anyone who is suffering from living in this broken world. 
I do not wish to dismiss the suffering, but my aim is to clarify the idea of “better not to have 
been born.” In Matt. 26:24 (cf. Mark 14:21) Jesus says of Judas, “It would be better for him if 
he had not been born,” which on the surface may appear to be asserting that Judas’s forever 
remaining non-existent is a better state of affairs to bring about than one where his existence 
eventuates in hell. However, Jesus is speaking of a person’s birth, not of his origination, 
original creation, or his existence vs. non-existence. There is a crucial different between the 
way Scripture uses this concept and the way Himma does. In Scripture, the language is that 
of life terminating at or before birth, never non-existence or never-existence (see Ecc. 4:3; 
6:3ff., and Job 3). The problem with Himma’s use is this: it could not have been better for 
him if he had never existed, for there would have been no him to have been better off. Non-
existent persons cannot receive benefits. Frankly, it is a mistake to say that person x would 
have been better off if they never existed: there would then be no one to be benefited, and to 
speak as if there were is a confusion.
A different interpretation of the it would be better if he never had been born intuition is pos-
sible and is commonly leveled against the traditional view of hell: the world would have been 
better if a particular reprobate person never existed, because there would be one less person 
in hell. Briefly, in response, I point out that it seems to assume there is a best of all possible 
worlds, or at least denies the possibility of two fundamentally good but incommensurately 
good possible worlds (one with certain otherwise unattainable goods that justify the exis-
tence of a populated hell). Both of these assumptions strike me as dubious: we need only 
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situated, imposing without argumentation a number of important as-
sumptions the defender of the doctrine does not share. Further, his own 
principles rule out procreation tout court, unless a contentious view (hard 
dogmatic universalism) is true. For those of us who find HDU a difficult pill 
to swallow,30 Himma’s argument and those like it will prove unpersuasive. 
I recognize that in order to mitigate some of the objections I have of-
fered, perhaps Himma’s basic argument could be reconstructed along 
these lines: with a traditional doctrine of hell and Christian exclusivism, it 
might seem natural to have considerations of eternal suffering outweigh 
most all other factors, even if said eternal suffering is justly deserved. For 
on the traditional view the suffering and torment in hell is everlasting and 
severe.31 Whatever good things might come from the person’s existence—
good and pleasurable experiences in life, benefits to the person’s parents, 
the goodness of her mere existence, the possibility of using creaturely 
freedom to love God and experience eternal happiness—these all seem to 
pale in comparison to the badness of eternal suffering in hell. However, 
it is not at all clear that goods and harms sum on a quantitative scale, 
as Himma’s argument suggests. The effort to do this seems doomed by 
tremendous difficulties. Even more importantly: we are certainly not in 
the best position to assess such matters. Many of the goods in this life and 
certainly in eternal life are unknown to us, and we have limited knowl-
edge of what existence in hell is like. Epistemic ignorance works both 
ways. Perhaps the goods that might come from a person’s existence in this 
world and in the next do in fact have critical mass, especially when we 
remember that most of them have a strong theological orientation. God 
matters most. While not suggesting that we entirely dismiss the emotional 
and psychological weight of the problem of hell, I suspect some of our 
intuitions here might be influenced by too low of a view of God’s holiness 
and too downplayed a regard for the severe heinousness of sin. 
When it comes to complex ethical decisions regarding procreation, we 
should proceed not by whittling down a short and general principle but 
rather by exercising a wisdom that draws from the breadth and depth of 
the Christian faith. Decisions about things like the risk of a genetic disease 
will be messy and involve vagueness—no simple rule will satisfactorily 
have a commitment that God must actualize a good world. (See Robert Adams, “Must God 
Create the Best?,” The Philosophical Review 81:3 [1972], 317–332.)
One final interpretation is that a person could wish that some other possible world were 
the actual one—she could have a preference for the actualization of some other possible 
world in which she does not exist. While admitting that she would not be benefitted from the 
realization of this wish, she could conceivably state that, as far as she is concerned, from her 
perspective one of those other possible worlds would have been better. While a somewhat 
interesting desire, it is ultimately unimportant, as God is the actualizer of possible worlds, 
not any human.
30Even if Himma’s own view—salvific pluralism—rather than HDU can somehow be 
shown to redeem NLP, many defenders of TDH will find it unacceptably problematic for a 
variety of other reasons.
31For a mere sampling, see Matt. 8:12; 13:42; 25:46; 2 Thes. 1:5–10; Rev. 14:9–10; 20:14, 15.
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apply in each and every situation (even with acknowledgements of 
vagueness built in to it). Such is the nature of complicated matters like 
this. When it comes to the Christian’s procreation decision and the pos-
sibility of one’s child finally rejecting God and facing the consequences, I 
suggest that—again drawing from the full wealth of the Christian world-
view—risk calculation gives way to faith, for the parents must trust that 
God will lead their child to repentance, and in cases where that does not 
happen, the parents trust that God is nonetheless good and wise in all 
things. Christian faith, it seems, includes trusting in the goodness of God, 
trusting that God himself has a theodicy able to cover even the reprobate, 
even if we are able only to gesture at defenses. Here I readily acknowledge 
that much more would need to be said to fill out this picture, but such a 
detailed constructive task must be left for another occasion.
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